Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 29

Issue 2

Article 8

1941

Negligence: The Standard of Care Required of Physicians
Roy Vance Jr.
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Torts Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Vance, Roy Jr. (1941) "Negligence: The Standard of Care Required of Physicians," Kentucky Law Journal:
Vol. 29: Iss. 2, Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol29/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

STUDENT NOTES
The writer contends that a valid consideration consists of a benefit
to the promisor to which he is not already entitled, and a detriment to
the promisee to which he is not already bound. Unless both these
factors are present, theke is no consideration, and a fortiorari no
contract.'
R. KNucxL s
WnmaI
NEGLIGENCE: THE STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF
PHYSICIANS
The standard of care generally required by the courts in negligence
cases is the degree of care that would be exercised by a reasonable
prudent man under the circumstances. The standard of care required
of a physician is the care ordinarily exercised by an average physician
1
In good standing practicing in the same or similar locality.
The cases do not make it clear why this change has been made
regarding physicians. There is a close analogy in the law pertaining
to persons who are hindered with physical infirmities. The amount of
care required of such persons takes into account their defects. Instead
of holding that the physical defect is one of the circumstances, the
courts have called the attention of the jury to those defects directly by
requiring the standard of care as usually exercised by persons with like
2
infirmities. This departure from the general rule in the case of perdefects was evidently made to insure the jury's conphysical
sons with
sideration of these defects.
What then is the reason for the departure from the general rule
In the case of physicians? The physician is required to have spent
some time in preparing himself for his work. He is supposed to possess
more knowledge about the practice of medicine than the layman. It is
only fair then that the physician should be held to exercise a greater
amount of skill than the layman. This requirement could have been
fulfilled by requiring the degree of care exercised by a reasonable
prudent man under the circumstances, one of the circumstances being
that defendant is a physician. Such a standard however does not call
the attention of the jury directly enough to the special skill and learning of the defendent. In order to impress the jury with the fact that
defendent holds himself out to the public as a skilled man, the courts
could have required the exercise of the degree of care generally exercised by an average physician. This requirement would have been
'Moore v. Kuster, 238 Ky. 292 (1931).
1Dunnian v. Raney, 118 Ark. 337, 176 S. W. 339 (1915); Whitsell v.
v, Hill, 101 Iowa 630, 70 N. W. 750 (1899); Wilks v. Black, 188 Mich.
478, 154 N. W. 561 (1915); Hales v. Raines, 146 Mo. App. 232, 130 S. W.
425 (1910).
,Ham v. City of Lewiston, 94 Maine 265, 47 Atl. 548 (1900); Carter
V, Village of Nunda, 66 N. Y. Supp. 1059, 55 App. Div. 501 (1900).
Plaintiff however in going about public places alone was called upon
to exercise such reasonable care and caution for his own safety as an
ordinary prudent person with a like infirmity would have exercised.

KENTUCKY LAw JoURNAL
satisfactory but for the fact that the term average physician Is too
broad. To determine who is an average physician it is not Intended
that all the quacks, the poor doctors, the good doctors, and the very
best be aggregated and a medium struck between them. Such a method
would place the average too low.' To remedy this the courts have found
it necessary to require the care of an average physician in good
standing.'
The English courts have been content with requiring the care
exercised by an ordinary physician.5 The American courts have further
qualified the standard by requiring the degree of care of an average
physician in good standing practicing in the same or similar locality.
Nowhere is there given a precise rationalization of this last qualification.
Some sections of the country have better equipment than others;
even so, it should not affect the standard of care. Regardless of
whether the physician has any equipment at all, he should be held to
exercise the degree of care of an average physician in good standing.
The type and quality of the equipment is only a circumstance and
should not affect the standard of care.
The primary purpose of the qualification apparently is to make a
distinction between the city and the country doctor. It is well known
that the city offers the young physician more opportunity and more
chance for advancement. It is only natural that the city should attract
the better men in the profession, leaving the less-qualified doctors to
practice in the country. If this be true, it could well be that the
average country doctor would be incapable of exercising the same
amount of care as exercised by the average city doctor. In such a case
it would in fact be discouraging the practice of medicine in the country
to require the same skill and knowledge of both the city and the country doctor.
As yet there has been little said by the courts as to the extent of
territory embraced by the words in the same or similar locality. It has
been said that these words include the entire organized community.0
Thus it would be flexible enough to include the town of Oskaloosa,
Iowa;' or a city the size of St. Louis, Missouri.8
In the above rationalization of the American standard it is seen
that a distinction is made between a city doctor and a country doctor.
' Holtzman v. Hoy, 118 Ill. 534, 8 N. E. 832 (1886).
'Comeaux v. Miles, 118 So. 786 (La. 1928); Seewald v. Gentry,
220 Mo. App. 367, 248 S. W. 445 (1926).
5Rich v. Pierpont, 3 F. & F. 35 (1862); Hancke v. Hooper, 7 Car.
& P. 8 81, (1830); 22 Halisbury's Laws of England 318, 319.
Note (1929) 78 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 91, 97.
1
Vander Wal v. Abbot, 167 N. W. 182 (Iowa 1918).
OMclarin v. Grenzmelder, 146 Mo. App. 478, 126 S. W. 817 (1910);
Hoover v. McCormick, 197 Ky. 509, 247 S. W. 718 (1923).
(The locality
is not where the services are rendered but where the physician
practices.)
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There are no cases in which a distinction has been made between a
general practicioner practicing in the poor sections of a city and a
practicioner practicing in the wealthy sections of the same city. The
same reasons for a distinction between the city and the country doctor
apply equally well in support of a distinction between two doctors practicing in different sections of the same city. As the distinction is made
in one case and not in the other, the American standard sets up an
arbitrary requirement.
If the rule were changed to require the physician to exercise the
degree of care ordinarily exercised by average members of the profession in good standing practicing under similar circumstances, it would
cease to be an arbitrary one. Stated as above, the rule would maintain
the objective standard of the average physician in good standing and
it would do away with the arbitrary requirement making a distinction
between a city doctor and a country doctor and refusing to make a distinction between two doctors practicing under different circumstances
in the same city. The locality would simply become one of the circumstances and would be taken into consideration along with the type of
equipment and other attendant circumstances of each particular case.
There are two other features of the American standard that should
be mentioned. First a physician is not required to exercise hfs best
skill and care so long as he measures up to the objective standard of
the average physician in good standing.' Secondly, a physician practicing under a school or branch of medicine other than the allopathic
is held only to exercise the care and skill exercised by the average
members of his particular school." The courts do not go into the
comparative merits of the different schools of medicine. Thus a sanipractor is not held to exercise the care of an average physician in good
standing but the care of an average sanipractor in good standing.u
RoY VANCE, JR.
TRADE REGULATION: INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT
AND REFUSAL TO DEAL IN THE ABSENCE OF

CONSPIRACY AND MONOPOLY
Early in the English common law there emerged the concept of
liability for inducing breach of contract where the defendant's act was
tortious per se,' for example, where the act itself constituted fraud,
9 Dorris v. Warford, 124 Ky. 768, 100 S. W. 768, 14 Ann. Cases 602
(1907); Wilks v. Black, 188 Mich. 478, 154 N. W. 561 (1915), cited
supra note 1. The physician is not required to possess or exercise the
highest degree of skill known to the profession in order to escape
liability, only such reasonable care as is generally used by physicians
in similar localities. Hales v. Raines, 146 Mo. App. 232, 130 S. W. 425
(1910), cited supra note 1.
nForce v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 AtL. 1116 (1893) (homeopath);
Wilcox v. Carroll, 127 Wash. 1, 219 Pao. 34 (1923) (sanipractor).
21
Wilcox v. Carroll, supra note 10.
See Restatement, Torts (vol. IV 1939) at p. 51: "Thus, in 1410, it

